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REDEFINING PARENTHOOD: 
CHILD CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION WHEN 
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES 
. DISSOLVE 
Kristine L. Burks· 
I. INTRODUCTIONl 
In California, the determination of child custody and visita-
tion rights is governed by inflexible and outdated definitions and 
. rules, rather than by the reality of the family unit. Biology,:a le-
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. Sincere thanks to my edi-
tors Rebecca Weisman, Monica McCrary, Gregg Zywicke, and Professor Roberta Simon 
for keeping this article focused and moving forward. 
1. Throughout this article references are made to sections of the California Civil 
Code, specifically the Uniform Parentage Act and Family Law Act. Effective January I, 
1994 these sections were repealed and replaced with equivalent provisions in the Family 
Code. Stats. 1992 c. 162 (A.B. 2650), §§ 3-4, operative Jan. I, 1994. Unless otherwise 
indicated, there is no change in the substantive law. To the extent there is no change in 
the substantive law, a provision under the Family Code is considered a restatement and 
continuation of the previously existing provision, not a new enactment. CAL. FAMILY 
CODE § 2 (West 1993). The author has chosen to refer to the repealed sections because 
these statutes are cited in the cases discussed in the article. 
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (West 1983) (defining "parent and child relationship" as 
"the legal relationship existing between a child and his [sic] natural or adoptive parents 
incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations.") 
(recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7601 (West 1993». In the rare instance where two 
women claim to be a child's natural mother, one based on a genetic relationship with the 
child and the other on the fact that she gave birth to the child, the court may look to the 
intentional acts of the parties in making its determination. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In a maternity dispute arising out of a surrogacy agreement, the 
California Supreme Court looked to the parties' intentions as manifested in the surro-
gacy agreement to determine who was the child's natural mother. The court held that 
"she who intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her 
own-is the child's natural mother." Id. The court found that presentation of blood test 
evidence and proof of having given birth to a child are but two means of establishing 
maternity. Id. at 779. 
223 
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gal adoption,8 and marriage to a woman who bears a child4 are 
the only means currently available for attaining the legal status 
of parent.1i Nevertheless, courts have had to determine custody, 
visitation, and child support rights for families who fall outside 
the traditional one mother and one father family model.s The 
California Legislature has limited the status of "legal parent"7 to 
those with a biological, adoptive, or marital tie to a child. Cali-
fornia courts consistently give a narrow interpretation of stat-
utes conferring jurisdiction and standing to assert rights to cus-
tody and visitation. Together, the Legislature and the courts 
have effectively prohibited many nonlegal parents formerly in-
volved in nontraditional relationshipss from asserting or ob-
taining any rights to child custody or visitation.9 Thus, individu-
als who function as children's parents,1° but who lack the legal 
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001. 
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983) (presuming a man is the biological father 
if he meets conditions set forth in Evidence Code section 621, or if he and the mother are 
married, or if before the child is born, he and the mother attempt to marry, or if after 
the child is born, he and the mother marry or attempt to marry or the father engages in 
conduct holding the child out as his own) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7611 (West 
1993». 
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood 
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483 (1990). 
6. Id. (defining traditional family as "one mother/one father"). 
7. Hereinafter, the author will use the term "legal parent" to refer to those whose 
parent-child relationships derive from biology, adoption, or marriage to a woman who 
bears a child. The author will use the term "nonlegal parent" to refer to those whose 
parent-child relationships derive from other means. 
8. Hereinafter, the author uses the terms "nontraditional family" and "nontradi-
tional relationship" to refer to family relationships extending beyond the traditional one 
mother/one father model. The relationship which is considered "nontraditional" is the 
relationship between the "parents." Nontraditional relationships include stepparents, 
same-sex partners, and unmarried heterosexuals. 
9. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991) (af-
firming lesbian partner was not a "parent" where she was not the biological or adoptive 
mother and she and the biological mother did not have a legally recognized marriage 
when the child was born); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(affirming lesbian partner was without standing to seek custody or visitation); Perry v. 
Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming superior court lacked 
jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding to award visitation of wife's children to 
husband/stepparent; although, in response to the court's decision, Civil Code section 
4351.5 was enacted in 1982 giving stepparents certain rights to visitation); In re Marriage 
of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming superior court without 
jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding to consider stepfather's custody 
request). 
10. Hereinafter, the author uses the term "functional parent" to refer to "anyone 
who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized 
parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in na-
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status of parents, are often left with no parental rights should 
their relationships with the legal parents dissolve. In addition, 
children are deprived of ongoing relationships with individuals 
they look upon as their parents. 
This article offers a method of providing custody and visita-
tion rights to individuals formerly involved in nontraditional re-
lationships who function as children's parents but who lack the 
legal status of parent. The article considers a broad range of 
nontraditional families, including stepparents, same-sex part-
ners, and unmarried heterosexuals.ll 
The article begins with a summary of California statutory 
law. The author examines how "parent" is defined and the limi-
tations imposed on those falling outside that definition when 
they seek to assert rights to child custody and visitation. Next, 
the article focuses on three types of nontraditional relationships 
to illustrate how California courts have applied the statutory law 
and how that application limits nonlegal parents'12 ability to 
gain standing to assert claims for custody and visitation and lim-
its courts' subject matter jurisdiction to consider such claims. In 
cases where nonlegal parents overcome the standing and juris-
dictional issues and make it into court, the article shows how the 
law works to summarily deny their claims, without considering 
any functional parent-child relationship that may have existed. 
Next, the article examines existing legal theories under 
which nonlegal parents attempt to use their functional relation-
ships to establish parental rights. The article also explores the 
failure of these theories to provide for functional parents or to 
adequately protect the rights of legally recognized parents from 
outside parties. The article then considers three innovative ap-
ture." Polikoff, supra note 5, at 464. 
11. Two recent notes focus specifically on the law's impact on lesbian-mother fami-
lies. See Lisa M. Pooley, Note, Heterosexism and Children's Best Interests: Conflicting 
Concepts in Nancy S. II. Michelle G., 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 477 (1993); Elizabeth A. Delaney, 
Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relationship 
Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (1991). 
12. The author uses the term "nonlegal parent" when not referring specifically to 
the rights of functional parents, as opposed to "functional parent," because not every 
individual asserting custody and visitation rights based on their relationship meets the 
definition of functional parent. See infra part V.B. for the author's proposed definition 
of functional parent. 
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proaches to resolving child custody and visitation disputes aris-
ing out of nontraditional relationships which do establish rights 
for functional parents. 
In conclusion, the author advises the California Legislature 
to redefine "legal parent" to include functional parents. The au-
thor recommends specific criteria for determining when a func-
tional parent-child relationship exists, taking into account the 
extent of the relationship itself, the child's perceptions of the 
relationship and the legal parent's intent in creating the rela-
tionship. This approach allows functional parents to seek cus-
tody and visitation according to the same standards as other le-
gal parents, while protecting legal parents from attempts by 
outside parties to establish parental rights. 
II. CALIFORNIA STATUTORY LAW 
The Uniform Parentage ActI8 (hereinafter "UP A") defines a 
legal parent as the biological or adoptive parent of the child. 14 
Under the UPA a mother may establish a parent-child relation-
ship by proof of having given birth to the child. III The UP A pro-
vides a number of ways for a father to establish a parent-child 
relationship.I6 Mothers and fathers can also establish a parent-
13. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983). The UPA was part of a package of 
legislation introduced in 1975. It "deals substantively with the rights of children and 
procedurally with the determination of parentage." Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal Rptr. 520, 
522 (Ct. App. 1990). The legislation's purpose was to eliminate the legal distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children. Under the UPA, parent and child rights are 
based on the existence of a parent-child relationship rather than on the marital status of 
the parents. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778-79 (Cal. 1993). 
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001. 
15. CAL. CIY. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7610(a) 
(West 1993». In rare cases, maternity may be established by other means. See supra 
note 2 and accompanying text. 
16. [d. § 7003(2)(3) (providing father-child relationship exists where father is the 
biological or adoptive parent) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7610(b)(c) (West 1993»; 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (see supra note 4 and accompanying test) (recodified as CAL. FAM-
ILY CODE § 7611 (West 1993»; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(a) (West 1983) (providing that 
where wife is impregnated through artificial insemination with consent of her husband, 
husband is considered biological father by law) (recodified as' CAL. FAMILY CODE 
§ 7613(a) (West 1993»; CAL. CIY. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) (providing by whom and 
under what circumstances an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a fa-
ther-child relationship may be brought) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 7630-7634 
(West 1993». 
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child relationship through proof of adoption.17 
A. CHILD CUSTODY 
California Civil Code section 4600,18 part of the Family Law 
ActI9 (hereinafter "FLA"), expressly recognizes that courts 
should award custody to legal parents in preference to nonlegal 
parents. lIO Section 4600 applies to "any proceeding where there is 
at issue the custody of a minor child. "lII This section alone does 
not create subject matter jurisdiction.22 An underlying proceed-
ing is required.28 
In custody disputes between legal parents, section 4600 per-
mits the court to award custody according to the "best interests" 
of the child.lI4 Yet, in disputes between legal parents and nonle-
gal parents, individuals falling outside the narrow statutory defi-
nition of legal parent given above must show that custody with 
the legal parents would be detrimental to the children.211 This 
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(3). 
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE 
§§ 3020-3021, 3040-3043 (West 1993». 
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5180 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). The FLA was adopted 
in 1970 and made substantive and procedural changes in the law governing what had 
traditionally been termed "divorce" and "annulment." 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL-
IFORNIA LAW § 22 (9th ed. 1990). With respect to child custody, a general objective of the 
FLA was to limit the power of the court to award custody to nonlegal parents. Prior to 
the FLA, a best interests standard was used in custody disputes between legal and nonle-
gal parents. Under the FLA, this standard was replaced with Civil Code section 4600(b) 
which provides an order of preference for courts to follow in awarding custody. 10 id. at 
§§ 116-17. 
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West 1983) (providing that custody should be 
awarded first to both parents jointly or to either parent) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE 
§ 3040(a) (West 1993». See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 257 (Cal. 1974), the seminal case 
interpreting section 4600. 
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE 
§ 3021 (West 1993». The Legislature has excepted certain proceedings from section 
4600. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(d) (West 1983) (providing that section 4600 shall 
not apply in actions to declare minor free from parental custody and control) (recodified 
as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7807 (West 1993». 
22. In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Ct. App. 1988); B.G., 523 
P.2d at 255 n.24; Marckwardt v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47 (Ct. App. 1984); 
Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (Ct. App. 1980). 
23. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32. 
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b). See B.G., 523 P.2d at 257; Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 
279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991). 
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3041 
(West 1993». ("Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
5
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"detriment" standard is considerably more restrictive than the 
"best interests" standard which the courts apply in disputes be-
tween legal parents/ole California courts have also applied this 
detriment standard where the nonlegal parent seeks not to ex-
clude the legal parent but to share custody with the legal par-
ent.27 While legal parents may petition the court for joint cus-
tody of a child,28 the law does not provide for joint custody 
between a legal and nonlegal parent when the legal parent ob-
jects.29 In situations where the legal parent objects to joint cus-
tody with the nonlegal parent, the nonlegal parent must show 
that custody with the legal parent is detrimental to the child.30 
The law sets up a "Catch 22" situation for the nonlegal parent. 
By requiring the nonlegal parent to show that custody with the 
legal parent is detrimental to the child, the nonlegal parent is 
forced to choose between seeking sole custody or no custody. A 
nonlegal parent who seeks to establish joint custody, over the 
objections of the legal parent, is left without a legal remedy.31 
Thus, the restriction for nonlegal parents is twofold. First, 
by limiting the definition of parent, the UP A initially limits 
which individuals can assert "parental" rights. Second, nonlegal 
parents who have standing, but who fall outside this definition 
of legal parent, must show that custody with the legal parents 
would be detrimental to the children before the court will award 
them custody.a2 
sons other than a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that 
an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a 
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child."). 
26. B.G., 523 P.2d at 257 ("As between parents, [section 4600] permits the court to 
award custody 'according to the best interests of the child,' but in a dispute between a 
parent and a nonparent, the section imposes the additional stipulation that an award to 
the nonparent requires a finding that 'an award of custody to the parent would be detri-
mental to the child .... ) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b), (c». 
27. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1); supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(3) (West 1983) (" 'Joint physical custody' means that 
each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody.") (emphasis 
added): id. § 4600.5(d)(5) (" 'Joint legal custody' means that both parents shall share 
the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education 
and welfare of a child.") (emphasis added). 
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c). 
31. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216: Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 
(Ct. App. 1990): In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 30 (Ct. App. 1988). 
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c). See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
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B. VISITATION 
California Civil Code section 4601 gives the court discretion 
to grant reasonable visitation rights "to any other person having 
an interest in the welfare of the child. "33 However, this section 
only applies where there is already some proceeding properly 
before the court in which custody is at issue.34 Individuals who 
are without an underlying proceeding, such as one for marriage 
dissolution, are unable to bring actions for visitation. In mar-
riage dissolution proceedings, any interested person may join the 
action and bring an action for visitation whether or not custody 
or visitation is at issue between the husband and wife.311 
Section 4601 does not provide a standard for the court to 
use in determining whether to award visitation. However, the 
California Court of Appeal has held that in visitation disputes 
between legal and nonlegal parents, where legal parents are in 
joint-opposition to visitation, nonlegal parents must present 
clear and convincing evidence that the denial of such visitation 
would be detrimental to the children.36 
Prior to 1982, courts had held that superior courts' jurisdic-
tion to award visitation in marital dissolution proceedings was 
limited to "children of the marriage."37 Thus, superior courts 
were without jurisdiction to award visitation rights to steppar-
ents in marriage dissolution proceedings.3s In response to what 
one court referred to as the "thorny problem of visitation by 
stepparents,"39 the' Legislature enacted California Civil Code 
section 4351.5 which, in marriage dissolution proceedings, con-
fers jurisdiction on superior courts to award reasonable visita-
tion rights to stepparents and grandparents when the courts de-
termine that visitation by that person is in the best interests of 
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3100 
(West 1993». 
34. Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 584 (Ct. App 1980); In re Marriage 
of Halpern, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (Ct. App. 1982). 
35. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863. See infra note 147 and ac-
companying text. 
36. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867. See infra part I1I.C. for a discussion of how the 
standard was conceived. 
37. Perry, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 586. 
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the child.·o Courts have consistently held section 4351.5 inappli-
cable to factual situations not specifically addressed by that sec-
tion.n For example, courts have held the statute inapplicable to 
a non biological parent in a same-sex relationship.·2 
The Legislature and the courts have chosen to make the 
rights of biological and adoptive parents paramount . .a Even dis-
cretionary visitation provided to some nonlegal parents "must 
give way to the paramount right to parent if the visitation cre-
ates conflicts and problems."" Nonlegal parents who are unable 
to avail themselves of an underlying proceeding, a requisite to 
asserting rights to custody under section 4600 and visitation 
under section 4601, are unable to bring their claims and, there-
fore, go unheard. Under existing law, many individuals are de-
nied any rights to custody or visitation because they lack biolog-
ical, adoptive, or marital links to the children-regardless of the 
existence of functional parent-child relationships. 
III. RELATIONSHIPS EXISTING LAW FAILS TO 
ADDRESS 
Existing law fails to adequately address the reality of fami-
lies falling outside the traditional model. Courts consistently re-
solve custody and visitation disputes in favor of legal parents 
regardless of the functional relationships existing between non-
legal parents and children.·11 As discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, the statutory law on its face severely limits the custody and 
visitation rights of nonlegal parents.·8 In turn, the courts have 
often given the statutes an even narrower interpretation. Using 
recent case law, this section examines how courts have inter-
preted current statutory law to find courts lack subject matter 
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE 
§3101(a) (West 1993». 
41. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1991). 
42.Id. 
43. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b), (c); In re 
B.G., 523, P.2d 244, 257 (Cal. 1974); supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
44. In re Marriage of Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331,334 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoted in 
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17). 
45. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); Curiale v. Rea-
gan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr. 
30 (Ct. App. 1988). 
46. See discussion supra part II. 
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jurisdiction to determine the parental rights of nonlegal parents 
and to deny nonlegal parents standing to assert parental rights. 
This section also illustrates the laws' impact on three different 
nontraditional families. The author does not suggest that every 
nonlegal parent involved in a nontraditional relationship should 
be entitled to custody and visitation. The author does suggest 
that courts should not exclude these individuals from asserting 
such rights merely because they lack biological, adoptive, or 
marital ties to the children. 
A. STEPPARENTS47 
Stepparent situations arise when two people marry and one 
or both partners have a child[ren] from a previous relationship. 
A stepparent is the non biological parent of his or her spouse's 
child[ren]. Should the marriage end in divorce, stepparents 
often bring actions for custody and visitation. The California 
Court of Appeal has found that trial courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider stepparents' claims for custody of 
stepchildren.48 However, California Civil Code section 4351.5 
confers subject matter jurisdiction on trial courts in marriage 
dissolution proceedings to award stepparents reasonable visita-
tion rights.49 
In In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis,50 the California Court 
of Appeal affirmed that existing statutory law did not provide 
the superior court with subject matter jurisdiction to award a 
stepparent joint custody of his stepchild. 51 In Goetz, the stepfa-
ther, Stephen, requested joint custody and reasonable visitation 
rights for both parties in his marriage dissolution proceeding. 52. 
The stepchild was born in 1980.58 Stephen and the child's 
mother had lived together from 1980 to 1985.54 During that time 
47. Although stepparent relationships are arguably not "nontraditional," they are 
discussed here because as nonbiological, nonadoptive parents, stepparents are deprived 
of certain parental rights, despite evidence of functional parent-child relationships. 
48. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32. 
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a). 
50. In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988). 
51. Id. at 32-33. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 30. 
54. Id. at 31. 
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the couple was married for one year. 1I1I The mother's petition for 
dissolution alleged there were no minor children of the mar-
riage.1I6 Stephen's petition alleged there was a minor child of the 
marriage "based on his acknowledgment of [the child] as his 
son."117 He based his request for custody on California Civil Code 
section 4600.116 The requisite underlying proceeding in this case 
was for marriage dissolution.1I9 The court, however, found that 
the jurisdiction conferred on a court by marriage dissolution 
proceedings to deal with the custody and visitation rights of 
stepparents is limited by California Civil Code sections 435160 
and 4351.5.61 Section 4351 gives the court jurisdiction in a mar-
riage dissolution proceeding to make any orders, as appropriate, 
regarding child custody.62 Section 4351.5, notwithstanding 4351, 
gives the court jurisdiction to award "reasonable visitation 
rights" to a stepparent when such an award is in the child's best 
interest.68 The court construed the two sections to limit its juris-
diction to awarding only visitation. Absent express provisions for 
custody in section 4351.5, the court found it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to consider a stepparent's rights to custody.64 
Stephen was granted visitation rights under California Civil 
Code section 4351.5.611 
While the extent of Stephen's relationship with the child 
was in dispute,66 even if it were undisputed that he functioned 
as the child's parent in every way, the result would have been 
the same. Stephen was never afforded the opportunity to at-
tempt to prove a parent-child relationship existed because the 
55. [d. 
56. [d. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. at 31; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) ("In any proceeding where there is at issue 
the custody of a minor child, the court may . . . make such order for the custody of the 
child ... as may seem necessary or proper."). 
59. [d. at 33. 
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 2010, 
2060 ) (West 1993». 
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5; Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32. 
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 ("The superior court has jurisdiction to inquire into and 
render any judgment and make such orders as are appropriate concerning status of the 
marriage, custody and support of minor children of the marriage, and children for whom 
support is authorized under Section 206.") 
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a). 
64. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32. 
65. [d. at 31. 
66. [d. 
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court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
custody rights of a stepparent.67 
Although a recent case affirmed an award of custody to a 
stepfather, it remained consistent with the holding in Goetz. In 
In re Marriage of Hinman,68 the California Court of Appeal af-
firmed an award of joint custody of five children to the husband, 
Howard. Three of the children were his biological children and 
two his stepchildren.69 The wife, and legal parent, designated all 
of the children as "children of the marriage" in her dissolution 
petition and stipulated to granting Howard joint custody.70 After 
the court entered final judgment, the wife challenged the court's 
jurisdiction to award Howard custody of the two stepchildren 
because he was not their biological father.71 The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the custody award under principles of waiver and es-
toppel. The court held that the wife's designation of the two 
stepchildren as "children of the marriage" in her petition and 
subsequent stipulation awarding the stepfather primary physical 
custody precluded her from later challenging the order on juris-
dictional grounds.72 The court held that jurisdiction does not 
"vanish" even if it is later shown that there were no children of 
the marriage.73 
The Court of Appeal did not find the trial court had juris-
diction to award custody based on any statute. In fact, the court 
noted that the trial court's award of joint custody may have ex-
ceeded its statutory authority because the children were 
stepchildren.74 The court acknowledged that in previous cases 
where the mothers did not designate the children as "of the 
marriage" and objected to the stepparents' attempts to gain cus-
tody, the courts correctly held that the stepparents had no stat-
utory basis on which to predicate their custody requests.711 How-
67. Id. at 32-33. 
68. In re Marriage of Hinman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (Ct. App. 1992). 
69. Id. at 248 
70. Id. at 245-46. 
71. Id. at 246. 
72. Id. at 247 ("A party who participates in or consents to a judgment which other-
wise would be beyond the court's authority is precluded from attacking it, absent excep-
tional circumstances."). 
73.Id. 
74. Id. at 248. 
75. Id. at 247 (citing Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980); In 
re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988». 
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ever, the Hinman court reasoned that the mother herself 
invoked the court's jurisdiction by alleging in her petition that 
the children were of the marriage.7s That allegation alone con-
ferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court to decide 
custody of the children.77 Thus, the Court of Appeal's decision 
remained consistent with previous decisions holding that step-
parents have no statutory grounds on which to base custody 
requests.7S 
While superior courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
award custody to stepparents, California Civil Code section 
4351.5 gives the courts jurisdiction to award them reasonable 
visitation. Although stepparents' rights are limited, they are not 
in danger of losing all rights with regard to their stepchildren. 
B. SAME-SEX P ARTNERS79 
Same-sex partner custody and visitation disputes may arise 
where two people of the same sex decide to conceive and raise a 
child together either through adoption, artificial insemination, or 
other means. Such a dispute can also arise where one partner 
brings a child from a previous relationship to the same-sex rela-
tionship, much like a stepparent relationship. Except in the rare 
case of a second parent adoption,90 only one of the "parents" 
will be the child's legal parent. Should the relationship dissolve, 
the nonlegal parent may attempt to bring an action for custody 
and visitation. 
Same-sex partners are even more disadvantaged in their 
pursuit of custody and visitation than are stepparents. In addi-
tion to the jurisdictional problems faced by stepparents, same-
sex partners also have difficulty gaining standing to assert their 
rights. Because stepparents are married to the legal parents, 
they gain standing to at least assert visitation rights through 
76. Hinman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246. 
77. Id. at 247. 
78. Id. See Perry, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584; Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32. 
79. The author uses the term "same-sex partner" to refer to the nonbiological or 
nonadoptive parent in a same-sex relationship. 
80. A second parent adoption is where two people of the same sex are permitted to 
adopt a single child. 
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their marriage dissolution proceedings.81 However, because the 
law does not recognize same-sex marriages,82 same-sex partners 
must find alternative ways to gain standing to assert their rights 
to custody and visitation.8S 
In Curiale v. Reagan,84 the California Court of Appeal af-
firmed a non biological, same-sex parent was without standing to 
initiate a proceeding seeking custody and visitation.86 Curiale, a 
partner in a lesbian relationship, sought custody of and visita-
tion with a child born to her partner during their relationship. 
Curiale and the child's biological mother shared a home for five 
years during which time they decided to have a child through 
artificial insemination and raise the child together.88 The child 
was born in 1985.87 From the time of the child's birth until June 
1988, Curiale provided the sole financial support for herself, the 
biological mother and the child.88 Although the couple's relation-
ship ended in December 1987, the couple entered into a written 
agreement89 which provided for sharing physical custody of the 
child.90 However, in June 1988, the biological mother informed 
Curiale she was no longer willing to share custody with Curiale 
or even allow Curiale to visit with the child.91 
Curiale brought an action for custody and visitation. She 
based her claims on California Civil Code sections 7015, 7020, 
and 4600. Sections 7015 and 7020 are part of the UP A which 
81. CAL. CIV. Coos § 4351.5. See Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 30. 
82. California does not recognize same-sex marriages. CAL. CIV. Coos § 4100 (West 
1983) (defining marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a 
man and a woman .... ") (recodified as CAL. FAMILY Coos § 300 (West 1993». 
83. An apparent solution to this dilemma would be for the same-sex partner to 
adopt his or her partner's child. However, traditionally, same-sex partners could not 
adopt a child without divesting their married partner of their parental rights. Only a few 
second parent adoptions have been allowed in California, as statutory law does not spe-
cifically provide for such. Delaney, supra note 11, at 215 (proposing statutory recognition 
of second parent adoptions); CAL. CIV. Coos § 221.76 (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as 
CAL. FAMILY Coos § 8617 (West 1993». 
84. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Ct. App. 1990). 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. Although Curiale attached a copy of the agreement to her complaint, the trial 
court declined to give it any effect. Curiale did not assert any contractual claims in the 
trial court nor on appeal. [d. at 522 n.1. 
90. [d. at 521. 
91. [d. 
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deals with the rights of children and the determination of par-
entage.92 Section 7015 confers standing on any interested party 
to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of 
a mother and child relationship.9s Curiale asserted her claim as 
an interested party and sought to establish the existence of a 
mother-child relationship.94 
Section 7015 does not specify the grounds for establishing a 
mother-child relationship.911 However, the Curiale court found 
the grounds for establishing a parent-child relationship under 
section 7015 are limited to biology and adoption. Thus, because 
the identity of the biological mother was undisputed, the court 
found section 7015 inapplicable to a lesbian-partner because, in 
the eyes of the court, a child could not have two mothers.96 The 
court reasoned, "While Civil Code section 7015 confers standing 
upon any interested person to bring an action to determine the 
existence or not of a parent-child relationship, it has no applica-
tion where, as here, it is undisputed defendant is the natural 
mother of the child."97 As in the stepparent situation presented 
in Goetz, the court declined to consider the functional relation-
ship between Curiale and the child as a basis for establishing the 
existence of a mother-child relationship under section 7015. 
Curiale also based her custody action on California Civil 
Code section 4600.98 As explained previously, section 4600 alone 
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.99 Jurisdiction de-
pends on a proceeding properly before the court in which 
custody is at issue.loo The issue of custody and visitation may be 
raised in the following proceedings: determination of mater-
nitylOl or paternity,t°2 marriage dissolution,t°s guardian-
92. [d. at 522. 
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7650 
(West 1993». 
94. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015. 
96. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See also, Delaney, supra note 11, at 181. 
97. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
98. [d. 
99. See discussion supra part II.A. 
100. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015. 
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006. 
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 310 
(West 1993)); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351. 
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ship/04 juvenile dependency/oil habeus corpus,1°s adoption,107 
and termination of parental rights. lOS 
For the reasons discussed above, Curiale could not bring an 
action to establish maternity.l09 As an unmarried, same-sex part-
ner, Curiale could not bring a dissolution proceeding.llo Because 
Curiale sought to share custody with the child's biological 
mother, not to exclude her, Curiale did not bring a guardianship 
action or one to terminate parental rights. lll A juvenile depen-
dency proceeding requires an allegation that the biological par-
ent is unfit.ll2 Curiale was seeking to establish joint-custody and 
was therefore not making that claim. llS Traditionally under Cal-
ifornia law, a same-sex partner cannot adopt a child unless the 
biological parent of the same-sex consents and relinquishes his 
or her own parental rightsY' Finally, a writ of habeus corpus 
can only be used by one who is entitled to custody of a child to 
regain custody of that child from another who is not legally enti-
tled to custody.llII Because Curiale lacked standing to avail her-
self of any of these proceedings, she could not bring her 
claims. lls The court concluded, "The Legislature has not con-
ferred upon one in plaintiff's position, a nonlegal parent in a 
same sex relationship, any right of custody or visitation upon 
the termination of the relationship."ll7 
Nancy S. u. Michelle G.llS also involved a custody and visi-
104. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West 1991). 
105. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994). 
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1507 (West 1991). 
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.10 (West 1991) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 8600 
(West 1993». 
108. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 232-233 (West 1991) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7820 
(West 1993». 
109. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990) 
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100; supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
111. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. 
112. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300. 
113. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. 
114. Delaney, supra note 11, at 184; CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20 (recodified as CAL. 
FAMILY CODE § 8604-06 (West 1993»; CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.76. See supra note 83 for 
discussion of recent exceptions to the traditional rule. 
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1507 (West 1991). 
116. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
117. Id. 
118. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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tation dispute arising out of a lesbian relationship.u9 In this 
case, the couple lived together for eleven years prior to the birth 
of the first child in 1980.120 A second child was born in 1984.121 
The couple planned to raise the children together and Michelle, 
the lesbian partner, participated in the artificial insemination of 
the biological mother.122 The children's birth certificates listed 
Michelle as the children's "father" and both children took 
Michelle's last name.123 The· children referred to each of the 
women as "mom. "124 Although the couple separated in 1985, 
they reached a custody agreement and followed it for the next 
three years until the biological mother sought to alter the ar-
rangement.1211 When Michelle objected, the biological mother ini-
tiated an action seeking a declaration that (1) Michelle was not 
a legal parent; (2) the biological mother was entitled to sole legal 
and physical custody; and (3) Michelle was entitled to visitation 
only upon consent of the biological mother.126 
The court found it had jurisdiction under the UP A to de-
cide whether Michelle was a parent of the children.127 The court 
reasoned that because Michelle had at all times maintained she 
was a parent of the children, she had standing to seek custody 
and visitation.128 However, the court determined that Michelle 
could not establish a parent-child relationship because she was 
not the biological mother, had not adopted the children, and she 
and the children's biological mother did not have a legally recog-
nized marriage when the children were born.u9 In determining 
that Michelle was not a parent, the court ignored any functional 
parental relationship which may have existed. The court's hold-
mg was based solely on the narrow statutory definition of 
parent. 
Because the court held Michelle was not a legal parent, sec-
1l9. [d. at 216. 
120. [d. at 214. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 215 n.2. Although the court did not specify. the court presumably found 
Michelle had jurisdiction under Civil Code section 7015. 
128. [d. at 215 n.2. 
129. [d. at 215. 
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tion 4600's detriment standard applied.180 Before the court could 
award Michelle custody over the objections of the biological 
mother, the court would have to find that custody with the bio-
logical mother would be detrimental to the children. However, 
because Michelle sought to share custody, not to exclude the bi-
ological mother, she was not making this claim and therefore 
was denied custody. 
In Nancy S. the court acknowledged that the record 
"strongly suggests" that the lesbian partner could prove that she 
had, from the children's point of view, performed the role of lov-
ing mother.l3l The court also agreed that the absence of any le-
gal relationship to the children had resulted in a "tragic situa-
tion."132 Nonetheless, the court held that Michelle was "entitled 
to seek custody and visitation over the objections of the chil-
dren's biological mother, based on the 'best interests' of the chil-
dren, only if she has alleged facts upon which the court could 
determine that she was a parent of the children."188 Michelle's 
role as loving mother was an insufficient basis for establishing a 
parent-child relationship. 
The court's findings in Nancy S. appear to conflict with the 
California Court of Appeal's holding in Curiale. In Nancy S. the 
court found it had jurisdiction under the UP A to decide whether 
Michelle was a parent.134 In Curiale the court found the UP A 
inapplicable.131i Because Curiale could not avail herself of an un-
derlying proceeding, the court also found it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to consider her claims under section 4600.188 One 
possible explanation for this conflict is that in Nancy S. the bio-
logical mother's action for a declaration that Michelle was not 
the children's parent provided the underlying proceeding neces-
sary for Michelle to assert her own parental rights.187 Because of 
the unpredictable nature by which same-sex partners are able to 
gain standing to assert their claims, it is difficult for them to be 
130. See CAL. CIY. CODE § 4600(c). 
131. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n.4. 
132. ld. at 219. 
133. ld. at 215; CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 4600(b), 7003(1). 
134. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
135. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990). 
136. ld. 
137. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214. See also, Delaney, supra note 11, at 186 (rec-
onciling Curiale and Nancy S). 
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apprised of their legal rights when making family planning deci-
sions. Indeed, a same-sex partner's ability to assert any parental 
rights may depend on someone else first bringing an action. lss 
C. UNMARRIED HETEROSEXUALS 
Unmarried heterosexual custody and visitation disputes 
may arise where third parties develop relationships with other's 
children. The most common example is where a girlfriend or 
boyfriend of the legal parent attempts to bring an action for cus-
tody and visitation when their relationship with the biological 
parent dissolves and an ongoing relationship with the child is 
unlikely.ls9 
As nonlegal parents, unmarried heterosexual partners can-
not obtain custody without first showing that custody with the 
legal parents is detrimental to the children and that custody 
with the nonlegal parents is in the children's best interests. ao 
The standard applied to actions for visitation is less clear. Only 
one case has addressed the nature of the findings necessary to 
award visitation.141 
In In re Marriage of Gayden, a2 the California Court of Ap-
peal held courts should not grant visitation under Civil Code 
section 4601 without clear and convincing evidence that denial 
of such would be detrimental to the child. as In Gayden, the 
court reversed a trial court's grant of visitation to a father's for-
mer girlfriend.144 The father petitioned the court for the dissolu-
138. See also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). A biological 
mother's lesbian partner was able to gain standing and establish visitation rights in a 
sperm donor's paternity action. His action provided the underlying proceeding necessary 
for the lesbian partner to assert her rights to visitation. Unlike the biological mothers in 
Curiale and Nancy S., the biological mother in Jhordan C. did not oppose visitation 
with the lesbian partner, as their relationship had not dissolved. Id. at 533, 537. 
139. Unmarried heterosexual relationships might also include friends of legal 
parents. 
140. CAL. CIV, CODE § 4600(c). 
141. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867 (Ct. App. 1991). 
142. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1991). 
143. 'Id. at 867; CAL, CIV, CODE § 4601 ("The court shall order reasonable visitation 
rights to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the child. 
In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other 
person having an interest in the welfare of the child."). 
144. Id. at 869. 
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tion of his marriage in August of 1986.1411 Following the dissolu-
tion in February 1988, the court granted the father custody of 
the child and the mother visitation rights.14e The court subse-
quently allowed the father's former girlfriend to be joined as a 
party to the proceeding.147 The girlfriend based her claim for 
visitation rights on her status as the child's "de facto parent."148 
In her declaration, she stated that she had lived with the father 
and the child from the time the child was seven months old until 
she was one year and nine months 01d.14e She also alleged that 
when the cohabitation ended, she continued to see the child fre-
quently until she and the father ended their relationship. The 
child was three and a half years old at that time. lllo The girl-
friend also charged that the child's mother had abdicated her 
parental rights by abandoning the child when the child was 
seven months old and that the girlfriend was the only mother 
the child had ever known. 1111 
The father acknowledged that he and his former girlfriend 
had "an on-again, off-again" relationship for two years and lived 
together for six months.11l2 Both the mother and father disputed 
the extent of the girlfriend's relationship with the child and be-
lieved that the girlfriend's continued involvement with the child 
would be detrimental to the child and the child's ongoing rela-
tionship with her parents. IllS The family counselor agreed that 
visitation in an atmosphere of hostility and bitterness would be 
harmful to the child, and a child psychologist declared that visi-
tation would not be in the child's best interests.lII4 
145. [d. at 863. 
146. [d. 
147. [d.; CAL. R. CT., rule 1252(b) (West Revised Ed. 1993) (UA person who has or 
claims custody or physical control of any of the minor children of the marriage or visita-
tion rights with respect to such children may apply to the court for an order joining him 
[sic] as a party to the proceeding."). Because the girlfriend was making such a claim, the 
court allowed her to be joined. The issue of custody or visitation dispute is properly 
before the court regardless of whether there is an actual custody or visitation between 
the legal parents. See Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863; Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980). 
148. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See infra part IV.A.2. for discussion of visitation 
rights based on de facto parent status. 
149. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. at 863. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. at 863-64. 
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Over the objections of both parents and contrary to the rec-
ommendations of the family counselor and child psychologist, 
the trial court awarded the father's former girlfriend visitation 
under California Civil Code section 4601.11111 The trial court ap-
parently based its decision upon a bare preponderance of the 
evidence that visitation was in the child's best interests.11l8 The 
California Court of Appeal reversed.11l7 Not only did the Court of 
Appeal doubt whether such visitation was in the child's best in-
terests, the court held that such a determination was an insuffi-
cient basis for awarding visitation rights over the joint opposi-
tion of the child's parents. IllS The court found that, except where 
the Legislature has specifically provided, courts may not grant 
visitation to a nonlegal parent under section 4601 over the joint 
opposition of the child's legal parents merely on a finding that 
such a grant would be in the best interests of the child.11l9 Where 
the legal parents are in joint opposition, the court held that visi-
tation should not be granted without clear and convincing evi-
dence that denial of such would be detrimental to the child.180 
Although no previous cases addressed the nature of the 
findings necessary to award visitation, the Gayden court relied 
on "the strong legislative preference for the rights of· parents 
over those of nonparents."181 The court acknowledged that cus-
tody and visitation differ in important ways but found that the 
parental preference expressed in section 4600 was relevant to de-
terminations involving visitation because visitation is a limited 
form of custody.18l1 The court also reasoned that "judicially com-
pelled visitation against the wishes of both parents can signifi-
cantly affect parental authority and the strength of the family 
unit."18s The court was persuaded by an earlier decision which 
held that visitation rights conferred by statute are "subordinate 
155. [d. at 864; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601; supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
156. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 868. 
157. [d. at 869. 
158. [d. at 868. 
159. [d. at 867. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 865·66. 
162. [d. The court looked to section 4600 which articulates the standard in custody 
cases. Under section 4600, the "best interests" standard is applied to disputes between 
legal parents, but a finding that custody with the parent would be detrimental is reo 
quired in disputes between legal and nonlegal parents. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46oo(c). 
163. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 865·66. 
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to the preservation of the parent/child family unit."164 
The Gayden court also looked to the limited rights afforded 
grandparents under section 4351.5.1611 While a best interests 
standard is used in determining whether to grant visitation to a 
grandparent, there is a rebuttable presumption that visitation is 
not in the child's best interests where the parties to the marriage 
are in joint opposition to the grandparent receiving any visita-
tion rights.166 The Gayden court reasoned that section 4351.5 
would be meaningless if visitation rights could be granted to a 
nonlegal parent under section 4601 merely upon a finding that it 
is in the child's best interests.167 Moreover, where there is a re-
buttable presumption that visitation with a grandparent is not 
in the child's best interests where the parents are in joint-oppo-
sition, the court reasoned that "the opposition of both parents 
ought to be given even greater weight when visitation is sought 
by unrelated persons not favored under [the current statutory 
law]."168 
Given the preferred status afforded to legal parents ex-
pressed in section 4600 and the deference given to parental 
wishes under section 4351.5 and in the case law, the Court of 
Appeal held that where the legal parents are in unified opposi-
tion to awarding visitation to a third party, the applicable stan-
dard for determining whether to grant visitation is a clear and 
convincing showing that denying visitation would be detrimental 
to the child.169 A finding that such a grant would be in the best 
interests of the child is insufficient. 170 
The court, however, cautioned that its holding did not mean 
that trial courts could never award visitation to nonlegal parents 
over the objections of legal parents: 
. We do not mean to suggest by this opinion that a 
court must always submit to the objection of bio-
164. Id. at 866 (quoting In re Marriage of Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331,334 (Ct. App. 
1981». 
165. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (b) (West Supp. 1993) 
(recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3103(a) (West 1993». 
166. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (k) (West Supp. 1993). 
167. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (b). 
168. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (favoring stepparents and grandparents). 
169. [d. at 867. 
170. Id. 
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logic or adoptive parents to a visitation award to 
another person with whom their minor child has 
developed a close attachment. As strong as the 
rights of such parents must be, there may be in-
stances in which a child would be significantly 
harmed by completely terminating his or her rela-
tionship with a de facto parent.17l 
The Gayden court suggested the following test for granting visi-
tation to a de facto parent: 
[Where an individual has] (1) lived with the child 
for a substantial portion of the child's life; (2) 
been regularly involved in providing day-to-day 
care, nuturance [sic] and guidance for the child 
appropriate to the child's stage of development; 
and, (3) been permitted by a biologic parent to 
assume a parental role.172 
The Gayden court's apparent willingness, in certain circum-
stances, to grant nonlegal parents visitation over the objections 
of legal parents is promising. However, the test has yet to be 
applied in an action under the UP A or FLA to support granting 
visitation to a nonlegal parent.17S 
As courts struggle to apply the statutory law to nontradi-
tional families, the decisions become more removed from chil-
dren's interests; for example, children's interest in maintaining 
relationships with those they perceive to be their parents. In an 
attempt to avoid the harsh results of the statutory law, nonlegal 
parents attempt to use existing legal theories as a basis for es-
tablishing parental rights. These theories are discussed in the 
following section. 
IV. EXISTING LEGAL THEORIES UNDER WHICH NON-
LEGAL PARENTS ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH 
PARENT -CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 
As previously discussed, California law limits a nonlegal 
parent's ability to gain standing and restricts lower courts' juris-
171. [d. at 868. 
172. [d. 
173. See infra note 184 for juvenile court cases citing the Gayden test. 
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diction to determine a nonlegal parents' parental rights. Individ-
. uals who consider themselves children's parents but lack biologi-
cal, adoptive, or marital ties to the children have used existing 
legal theories such as de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and 
equitable estoppel in attempts to gain standing or give courts 
jurisdiction to decide their claims. This section discusses the use 
of these existing legal theories and their respective 
shortcomings. 
A. DE FACTO PARENTHOOD 
The California Supreme Court has described a de facto par-
ent as "that person who, on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role 
of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical and psycho-
logical needs for affection and care."174 De facto parenthood is 
alleged in actions for custody and visitation by parties who fall 
outside the statutory definition of legal parent, but who consider 
themselves to be the children's parents. 
1. Child Custody 
In In re B.G., 17& the California Supreme court held that de 
facto parents, such as foster parents, have standing to "assert 
and protect their own interests in the companionship, care, cus-
tody and management of the child."178 However, in determina-
tions of custody, the court held that section 4600 applies;177 
While de facto parents may have standing to bring their 
claims, they will not be awarded custody according the same 
standards applied in disputes between legal parents.178 The 
court in B.G. expressly stated that, "We do not hold that a de 
facto parent is a "parent" or "guardian" as those terms are used 
174. In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974). See also CAL R. CT., rule 
1401(a)(4) ("IA de facto parent is] a person who has been found by the court to have 
assumed, on a day to day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's physical and 
psychological needs for care and affection and who has assumed that role for a substan· 
tial period."). 
175. In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974). 
176. Id. at 254. 
177. Id. at 255. 
178. Id. at 257-58. See also Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 272 Cal. Rptr., 212, 216 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
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in Juvenile Court Law."179 Like other nonlegal parents, courts 
may award de facto parents custody only if they establish that 
custody with the legal parents would be detrimental to the 
children. ISO 
2. Visitation 
The California Court of Appeal indicated that there may be 
certain circumstances that warrant an award of visitation to a de 
facto parent over the objections of the child's legal parents.18l In 
Gayden, the court held that the applicable standard for deter-
mining visitation rights where the parents are in joint opposition 
is whether the denial of visitation would be detrimental to the 
child.182 Although in that particular case the court denied visita-
tion with the child's alleged de facto mother, the court went on 
to suggest that under certain circumstances, visitation with a de 
facto parent should be awarded.18s 
The Gayden court's willingness to consider the functional 
role of a de facto parent in determining visitation rights while 
protecting parental autonomy by requiring the permi&sion of the 
biological parent is encouraging. However, the implications of 
this case on functional parents seeking visitation is still unclear. 
To date, no court has used the Gayden test to support an award 
of visitation in an action brought under the UP A or FLA.184 
179. B.G., 523 P.2d at 254 n.21. 
180. Id. at 257·58. See also Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 272 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 
1991); Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr 781 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Lynna B., 155 
Cal. Rptr. 256 (Ct. App. 1979); In re Volkland, 141 Cal Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1977). 
181. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 868 (Ct. App. 1991). See supra 
part III.C. for discussion of the facts. 
182. This standard is considerably easier to meet than the test applied in custody 
disputes between legal and nonlegal parents. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
183. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 868. See supra part m.c for discussion of the cir· 
cumstances which may warrant such an award. 
184. Two cases involving juvenile dependency proceedings have cited the Gayden 
test in awarding visitation to a de facto parent. See In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 512, 515· 
16 (Ct. App. 1992) (using Gayden test to support award of three·way visitation to child's 
mother, father, and de facto father); In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 452 (Ct. App. 
1993) (using Gayden test to support award of visitation to child's de facto mother who 
had previously been the lesbian partner of child's adoptive mother). 
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B. IN Loco PARENTISI8& 
The California Court of Appeal has described a person 
standing in loco parentis as: 
[A] person who has put himself [sic] in the situa-
tion of a lawful parent by assuming the obliga-
tions incident to the parental relationship, with-
out going through the formalities necessary to 
legal adoption, ... stand[s] in loco parentis, and 
the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are 
the same as those of the lawful parent.IS8 
California courts have used the common law doctrine of in 
loco parentis in the context of tort law to impose upon persons 
standing in loco parentis the same rights and obligations im-
posed by statutory and common law upon parents187 and to con-
fer certain benefits upon children such as more favorable inheri-
tance tax treatment188 and worker's compensation benefits.189 
However, California courts have never applied the doctrine of in 
loco parentis. to give a nonlegal parent the same rights as a legal 
parent in a custody dispute.19o 
C. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of estoppel is: 
[I]mposed by law in the interest of fairness to 
prevent the enforcement of rights which would 
work fraud or injustice upon the person against 
whom enforcement is sought and who, in justifia-
ble reliance upon the opposing party's words or 
conduct, has been misled into action upon the be-
185. This doctrine is similar to the doctrine of de facto parenthood, and at least one 
court has used the terms interchangeably. In re Marriage of Halpern 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 
747 (Ct. App. 1982). 
186. Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Ct. App. 1964). 
187. See, e.g., Costello v. Hart, 100 Cal. Rptr. 554, 556 (Ct. App. 1972). 
188. See, e.g., Loomis, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. 
189. See, e.g., Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 196 P. 257, 
260 (Cal. 1921). 
190. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1991). A same-sex 
partner advanced this theory arguing that the court could apply this doctrine to give her 
the same custody and visitation rights as a legal parent. The court declined. 
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lief that such enforcement would not be sought. leI 
Under some circumstances, California courts have used the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent husbands from denying 
paternity to avoid paying child support where the husbands 
have previously represented to their wives' children that they 
were their biological fathers. le2 The California Court of Appeal 
has held that where: (1) a husband represented to the child that 
he was his or her father; (2) the child relied upon the representa-
tion; (3) the child was unaware of the true facts; and (4) the 
representation was of such a duration as to frustrate the oppor-
tunity for the child to establish a parent-child relationship with 
the true biological father, the husband is estopped from denying 
his paternity for the purpose of avoiding paying child support. lea 
However, California courts have never used the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel against a biological parent to award custody or 
visitation to a nonlegal parent.Ie• 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
The aforementioned theories and existing statutory law do 
191. Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1265, (N.Y. 
1982) (quoted in Brenda J. Runner, Protecting a Husband's Parental Rights When his 
Wife Disputes the Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. LAW 115 (1989-90)). 
192. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122 (Ct. App. 1979); Cleven-
ger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1961). See also Polikoff, supra note 5, 
at 491. 
193. In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal Rptr. 38,41 (Ct. App. 1975); Clevenger, 11 Cal 
Rptr. at 716-17. See also, In re Guardianship of Ethan S. 271 Cal. Rptr. 121, 130 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that a husband is estopped from asserting paternity based on a 
presumption of fatherhood where he represents to a child that he is not the child's father 
and the child relies on that representation). 
194. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1991). A same-sex 
partner argued that the court should apply the doctrine to prevent the biological mother 
from denying the existence of a parent-child relationship that she encouraged and sup-
ported for many years where the purpose of her denial was to obtain sole custody of the 
children. The court declined to do so. Although the court acknowledged that other states 
have used the doctrine to prevent a wife from denying the paternity of her husband, the 
court explained that its use in the out-of-state cases is based on "[olne of the strongest 
presumptions in law. . . that a child born to a married woman is the legitimate child of 
her husband." Runner, supra note 191, at 116 (quoted in Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 
218). Because Nancy S. involved a dispute between two unmarried, same-sex partners, 
the court reasoned that the out-of-state cases were inapplicable because, here, no such 
presumption existed. For a discussion of these out-of-state cases, see Runner, supra note 
191, at 115. See also Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130; supra note 193 and accompanying 
text. 
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not recognize the reality of children's lives. Courts cannot make 
the family life of all children uniform. As one legal scholar notes, 
"[w]hen parents create a nontraditional family, that family be-
comes the reality of the child's life. "l9II Children's interests 
should be protected within the context of their nontraditional 
families. 19G . 
Current doctrines establishing parental rights must strain to 
encompass the area of child custody and visitation. These doc-
trines were either not intended to deal with child custody and 
visitation or were not intended to deal with nontraditional fami-
lies. Even if nonlegal parents were able to establish custody and 
visitation rights under these doctrines, the doctrines would still 
be inadequate. Taken literally, none of these doctrines specifi-
cally requires the legal parent's cooperation in the creation of 
the parent-child relationship. The doctrines focus exclusively on 
the acts of the nonlegal parent, and the intent of the legal par-
ent in establishing a parent-child relationship between the child 
and nonlegal parent is irrelevant. Thus, parental autonomy re-
mains unprotected, exposing legal parents to the possibility of 
litigation brought by outsiders such as long standing child-care 
providers, relatives, friends, or others whom the legal parents 
never intended to function as their children's parents and whom 
children do not perceive to be their parents.19'7 
A. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
Two states have developed innovative approaches to child 
custody and visitation disputes involving nonlegal parents, one 
by statute and one by case law. A third approach is a scholarly 
reassessment of parental status which no court or legislature has 
yet adopted.198 This section will discuss and analyze these three 
approaches. Each approach is significant in that each acknowl-
edges the reality of the children's lives in nontraditional family 
environments and attempts to fashion rules to serve the chil-
dren's interests within the context of those families should they 
195. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 482. 
196. [d. 
197. The Gayden test, enunciated under the doctrine of de facto parenthood, does 
provide for the protection of parental autonomy. See discussion supra part III.C. 
198. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 483. 
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dissolve.199 
1. Child-parent Relationship 
An Oregon statute permits anyone who "has established 
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" 
to intervene or petition for custody or visitation.20o The statute 
also permits any person who "has maintained an ongoing per-
sonal relationship with substantial continuity for at least one 
year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutual-
ity" to petition the court for visitation.201 The court will grant 
visitation "[i]f the court determines from clear and convincing 
evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child and is 
otherwise appropriate in the case."202 In addition to conferring 
standing to persons with parent-child relationships, the statute 
also gives the court broad discretion to grant "custody, guardi-
anship, right of visitation, or other generally recognized right of 
a parent or person in loco parentis" where the court determines 
such a grant is appropriate and in the best interests of the 
children.203 
This statute is in sharp contrast to California statutory law. 
Under California law, courts have found that individuals basing 
their custody and visitation rights on parent-child relationships 
lack standing to assert such rights.204 Under California statutory 
law, individuals basing their custody rights on parent-child rela-
199.Id. 
200. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989). 
201. Id. § 109.119(5). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. § 109.119(1). Child-parent relationship is defined as: 
[AI relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part, 
within six months preceding the filing of an action under this 
section, and in which relationship a person having physical 
custody of a child or residing in the same household as the 
child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child food, 
clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the 
child with necessary care, education and discipline, and such 
relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interac-
tion, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled 
the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the 
child's physical needs. 
Id. § 109.119(4) (excluding foster parents unless the relationship continued for more 
than three years). 
204. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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tionships must first show that custody with the legal parents 
would be detrimental to the children.2011 Traditionally, California 
courts have held that visitation rights of nonlegal parents must 
give way if legal parents oppose the visitation.208 The Oregon 
statute allows the court to grant custody or visitation to a person 
in a parent-child relationship where such a grant is in the best 
interests of the child.207 
Unlike California statutory law, the Oregon statute allows 
for joint-custody between a legal parent and nonlegal parent 
over the objections of the legal parent.20S The Oregon Supreme 
Court stated that "it would never be proper to give custody to 
someone other than the natural parent unless custody in the 
other person best served the child's interests."209 While award-
ing joint custody would require a "best interests" standard, 
"compelling reasons" are required before a court will deprive a 
legal parent of custody in favor of a nonlegal parent.210 
One legal scholar described the Oregon statute as "the most 
well-developed understanding of parental relationships absent 
biological or adoptive ties."2l1 However, the same scholar also 
criticized the statute for not sufficiently protecting parental 
rights. 212 The statute does not require any showing of the legal 
parent's intent to create a parental relationship between his or 
her child and the third party. Under the statute, a live-in baby-
sitter, boyfriend, girlfriend, or a relative who had lived in the 
parent's home could seek custody or visitation.213 
The statute is also unnecessarily restrictive in its require-
ment that the petitioner have custody of or have lived with the 
child within six months of bringing the action.21• This require-
205. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c). 
20S. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 21S-17 (Ct. App. 1991); Curiale, 
272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See supra part IV.A.2. for discussion of recent trends in conflict 
with traditional holdings. 
207. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1). 
208. Intact lesbian-mother couples have been awarded joint-custody under the stat-
ute. In re L.O. & E.W., No. 15-89-0096 (Or. Cir. Ct., Lane Cty., Feb. 7, 1989). 
209. In re Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 6S n.9. (1987). 
210. Id. at SO-S3. 
211. Polikotf, supra note 5, at 48S. 
212. Id. at 488. 
213. Id. 
214. Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(4). 
29
Burks: Redefining Parenthood
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
252 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:223 
ment may exclude an individual who functions as a parent with 
the legal parent's consent but who does not petition the court 
within six months of the dissolution of his or her relationship 
with the legal parent.2111 If the individual remains a functional 
parent, it is inappropriate to limit that person's relief to visita-
tion and require proof that visitation is in the best interests of 
the child.216 
2. Equitable Parenthood 
An equitable parent is one who is not the biological parent 
of the child but who desires such recognition and is willing to 
accept the obligations of supporting the child, in return for "re-
ciprocal rights" of custody and visitation.:m The Michigan Court 
of Appeals created the doctrine of equitable parent in Atkinson 
v. Atkinson.218 In that case, the mother of a four-year-old son 
argued that the court should deny her ex-husband custody and 
visitation because he was not the biological father of the child 
conceived and born during the marriage. The Court of Appeals 
granted the ex-husband custody, finding: 
[A] husband who is not the biological father of a 
child born or conceived during the marriage may 
be considered the natural father of that child 
where (1) the husband and the child mutually ac-
knowledge a relationship as father and child, or 
the mother of the child has cooperated in the de-
velopment of such a relationship over a period of 
time prior to the filing of the complaint for di-
vorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights 
afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is will-
ing to take on the responsibility of paying child 
support.219 
Equitable parenthood is grounded in the theories of equita-
ble estoppel and equitable adoption.220 A significant aspect of 
the doctrine is its recognition of the husband's rights based upon 
216. Polikoff, supra note 6, at 488-89. 
216. Id. 
217. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Mich. App. 1987). 
218. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. App. 1987). 
219. Id. at 619. 
220. Id. at 619-20. 
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his relationship to the child, not based upon his marriage to the 
child's mother.221 Under the equitable parent doctrine, a person 
who is indisputably not the biological parent of the child may 
acquire parental rights.222 
California courts have expressly declined to adopt the doc-
trine of equitable parenthood. In Goetz, the California Court of 
Appeal refused to apply the doctrine to a stepfather's request 
for joint-custody of his stepson.223 The court acknowledged that 
it is arguable that the Legislature gave limited recognition to the 
equitable parent doctrine by giving stepparents limited visita-
tion rights.m Yet, ultimately the court declined to recognize the 
doctrine, again deferring to the Legislature because given the 
"complex practical, social and constitutional ramifications" the 
court believed that the Legislature is better able to consider the 
expansion of the law in this area.2211 
Of the three approaches discussed in this section, equitable 
parenthood is the only one that explicitly requires the legal par-
ent's cooperation in creating a relationship which is parental in 
nature. The author believes the major shortcoming of this doc-
trine is that it was conceived in the narrow context of marriage 
dissolution proceedings, applying only to children born or con-
ceived during the marriage. Thus, a court could distinguish this 
case if faced with a dispute arising from the dissolution of a 
same-sex or unmarried heterosexual relationship.226 A court, 
however, should not do so. The test articulated in Atkinson 
could easily be adapted from a marital situation to a nonmarital 
one.227 If a nonlegal parent satisfies the three elements of the 
Atkinson test, he or she is no less a parent than was the hus-
band in Atkinson.228 
221. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 484. 
222. In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1988). 
223. Id. See supra part III.A. for discussion of the facts. 
224. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5. 
225. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33. 
226. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 485. 
227. Id. (discussing the test's application to lesbian-mother relationships). 
228. Id. 
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3. Nonexclusive Parenthood 
Nonexclusive parenthood is a hybrid of the child-parent re-
lationship and equitable parenthood approaches.229 Legal 
scholar Katharine Bartlett230 proposed this approach but no 
court or legislature has adopted it.231 Her approach redefines 
parenthood into a nonexclusive status and permits awards of 
custody and visitation based on the child's best interests.232 
Under this approach, courts should grant party status to legal, 
biological, and psychological parents in custody and visitation 
disputes. Bartlett defines three criteria for identifying a psycho-
logical parent: (1) "physical custody of the child for at least six 
months;" (2) "mutuality" where the adult's motivation is "genu-
ine care and concern for the child and the child perceives the 
adult's role to be that of [a] parent;" and (3) "the relationship 
with the child began with the consent of the child's legal parent 
or under court order."233 
Like the Oregon statute, this approach requires that the 
parent-child relationship be one of "mutuality." However, Bart-
lett's definition of mutuality provides that the child must per-
ceive the adult's role to be that of a parent.23' Bartlett notes 
that if the child perceives the relationship to be subject to the 
discretion of the legal parent, "a true psychological parenting re-
lationship does not exist."23Ci 
Unlike the Oregon statute and the existing legal theories as-
serted in California, this approach requires the relationship be-
gin with "the consent of the child's legal parent or under court 
order."286 While this is an important requirement, one legal 
scholar has criticized it for not defining what specifically the le-
gal parent must consent to.237 To the extent that this approach 
229. [d. 
230. Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Duke University. 
231. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Promise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 
70 V A. L. REV. 879 (1984). See also Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489. 
232. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489. 
233. Bartlett, supra note 231, at 946-47. 
234. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489-90. 
235. Bartlett, supra note 231, at 947. 
236. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489-90. 
237. [d. at 490 ("Because parental autonomy would be eviscerated unless the stan-
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makes it clear that the child must consider the adult to be a 
parent, the legal parent should also consider the other adult to 
be a parent.238 
B. REDEFINING PARENTHOOD 
California courts have overwhelmingly declined to address 
the problems relating to child custody and visitation specific to 
nontraditional families by mechanically adhering to and nar-
rowly interpreting existing statutory law. The courts, restricted 
by existing statutory law, have often deferred to the Legislature 
when forced to apply these statutes to nontraditional 
relationships.239 
The Legislature must respond. The Legislature should rede-
fine parenthood to include functional parents. In addition to de-
fining a legal parent as someone with a biological or adoptive tie 
to the child, the definition should include an individual who 
functions as a child's parent and whose relationship with that 
child developed with the consent and cooperation of a legally 
recognized parent.240 Such a definition would fit the reality of 
today's nontraditional families, allowing biological, adoptive, 
and functional parents to compete for child custody and visita-
tion on equal grounds. 
By defining legal parents to include those in functional par-
ent-child relationships, functional parents would gain standing 
dard were rigid, parenthood should not be conferred unless the legal parent consents to 
or cooperates in the formation of an explicit parent-child relationship between the adult 
and the child."). 
238. Id. 
239. In Nancy S. the court reasoned: 
By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex 
social and policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the par-
ticular case, we are not telling the parties that the issues they 
raise are unworthy of legal recognition. To the contrary, we 
intend only to illustrate the limitations of the courts in fash-
ioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and so-
cially significant issue. 
Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991). See also Curiale v. 
Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 
Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1988); Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586 (Ct. 
App. 1980). 
240. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 573. 
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to bring their claims and compete on equal footing with biologi-
cal and adoptive parents for custody and visitation. Because 
functional parents would be considered legal parents, courts 
would no longer require them to show that custody with the le-
gal parents is detrimental before asserting custody rights of their 
own. 
The UP A defines the "parent and child relationship" as 
"the legal relationship existing between a child and his [sic] nat-
ural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or im-
poses rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the 
mother and child relationship and the father and child relation-
ship."241 The author proposes that the statute be amended to 
read "the legal relationship existing between a child and his or 
her natural, adoptive, or functional parents .... " Under this 
approach a functional parent is one who, though not a biological 
or adoptive parent of a child, may be considered a parent where: 
(a) the individual and the child mutually ac-
knowledge the relationship as parent and child; 
and 
(b) the individual has made available to the child 
food, clothing, shelter, and incidental necessaries 
and provided the child with the necessary care, 
education, and discipline; and 
(c) the individual has resided with or had physical 
custody of the' child for at least one year; and 
(d) the parent-child relationship has developed 
with the support and cooperation of the legally 
recognized parent, with the intent that the rela-
tionship be parental in nature, or under court 
order.242 
241. CAL, CIV, CODE § 7001. 
242. A similar amendment was proposed in an earlier note. See Delaney, supra note 
11, at 210. The proposed statutory amendment included de facto parents, and the statu-
tory definition of de facto parent included the following criteria: 
(1) The biological mother and the nonmarital partner must 
have mutually decided to start a family prior to the child's 
conception; 
(2) the nonmarital partner and the child must mutually ac-
knowledge a relationship as parent and child; 
(3) the relationship must have been in existence for at least 
one year prior to the time of filing the action to determine 
parentage, during which time the nonmarital partner must 
have had physical custody of the child or resided in the same 
household as the child; and 
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As legal parents, functional parents will be able to intervene or 
petition for custody or visitation. The proposed definition will 
eliminate standing and jurisdictional problems by elevating 
functional parents to the status of legal parents.243 
Both the Legislature and the courts have expressed concern 
for the protection of parental autonomy. The proposed approach 
protects parental autonomy by requiring that the parent-child 
relationship develop with the support and cooper~tion of the le-
gally recognized parent, with the intent that the relationship be 
parental in nature. This approach· also protects children's best 
interests by preventing legal parents from cutting off, for any 
reason, parent-child relationships which the legal parents ini-
tially supported and helped develop. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Broadening the definition of legal parent and focusing on 
the parent-child relationship will clarify existing uncertainties 
related to parental rights and nontraditional families. Contrary 
to existing approaches, the author's proposed approach will ac-
commodate functional parents involved in a variety of nontradi-
tional families should these families dissolve. In addition, by rec-
ognizing nontraditional family relationships, the law will no 
longer condone disparaging community attitudes. This change in 
the law may lead society to reevaluate many current positions. 
(4) the nonmarital partner must have supplied or otherwise 
made available food, clothing, shelter, and incidental neces-
saries and provided the child the necessary care, education, 
and discipline, on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, 
companionship, interplay, and mutuality that fulfilled the 
child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's 
physical needs. 
Delaney, supra note 11, at 212. While the proposed criteria focus on the relationship and 
seek to protect the biological parents, they are unnecessarily restrictive. The criteria cer-
tainly solve the problems faced by the lesbian-mothers in Nancy.S and Curiale, the two 
cases the note addressed. However, they exclude stepparents and any other individuals 
with whom the biological mothers did not agree to start families with prior to the chil-
dren's conception. This would include individuals who develop relationships with the 
children subsequent to the children's conception and birth or to men and women who 
unintentionally conceive a child. Functional parent-child relationships may develop with 
the consent and cooperation of the legal parents following the children's conception. Any 
proposed legislative amendment must address such relationships. 
243. The author derived the proposed criteria from the three previously discussed 
approaches and from the Gayden test articulated by the California Court of Appeal. 
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For example, as more men are legally recognized as functional 
parents and are awarded custody and visitation, attitudes to-
wards areas like child care and family leave may change, making 
them more attractive to a broader range of people. These areas 
are more likely to be addressed to the benefit of all parents, men 
and women alike, should the Legislature include functional par-
ents in its definition of parent. 
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